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NOTES
UTILIZING TBE DOCTRINE OF ADVERSE INFERENCES
WHEN FOREIGN ILLEGALITY PROHIBITS DISCOVERY: A
PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE*
With the growth of a modem, global economy, commercial
business transactions routinely involve multinational corporations with offices located in, and subject to the laws of, a foreign
jurisdiction.' The increase in multinational commerce has led to
a concomitant increase in multinational commercial litigation.2
In addition to concerns about service and jurisdiction, litigants
engaged in such litigation often require the production of evidence located in a foreign jurisdiction where the law of situs
prohibits disclosure.3
The problem is not new. Courts and legislatures have struggled to produce equitable solutions designed both to protect the
interest in full disclosure in the domestic litigation and to balance the comity interests of the foreign sovereign.4 As a result,
domestic litigants seeking the production of documents and
records located abroad and subject to nondisclosure statutes are
faced with the task of negotiating a morass of issues involving
corporate control, comity balancing, foreign illegality and waiver,
changing discovery standards, good faith, prerequisites to compelled discovery, available alternatives to direct discovery, and
possible sanctions for noncompliance with a production order.5
* Special thanks to Conrad M. Shumadine, Esq., of Willx & Savage, P.C., for
providing invaluable guidance.
1. See generally GARY B. BORN & DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 1 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing how the increase in

international trade and investment has led to increased civil litigation in American
courts).
2. Id.
3. See infra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 83-146 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 10-169.
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The law with respect to compelled production of evidence
located abroad and subject to nondisclosure statutes is relatively
settled. Although minor variations exist between circuits, the
tests applied to determine whether a court should exercise its
unquestioned authority to compel a party to produce evidence,
and whether a party is subject to nondisclosure statutes, are
essentially the same. Judges and scholars have addressed which
factors should be determinative in the decision to order production, the decision to compel production, and the decision to
award sanctions for noncompliance. Inquiries into issues of comity, good faith, and hardship are indicative of the judiciary's
reluctance to impose harsh penalties when foreign illegality is
invoked as an excuse for nonproduction.
Rather than attempting to provide an academic evaluation of
the wisdom of the leading decisions in this area, this Note proposes not that the tests established by the leading decisions in
this area are deficient in terms of providing a framework for
examining the litigants' behavior, but rather that limiting a
court's options to a choice between sanctions for nonproduction
and virtual surrender to the nondisclosure statute is inadequate.
Accordingly, this Note provides a practical road map to the judicial prerequisites to a production order and advocates the increased use of the doctrine of adverse inferences when foreign
illegality is offered as an excuse for nonproduction of evidence
located abroad. This Note will show that the doctrine of adverse
inferences provides an intermediate approach for a court to
utilize when either the existing tests provide inconclusive results
or when factual determinations regarding the secreting of evidence abroad warrant jury deliberation.
The general rule is that the nonproduction of available witnesses or evidence, or the destruction or spoliation "of evidence
that would naturally have been produced by an honest and
therefore fearless claimant permits the inference that its tenor is
unfavorable to the party's cause."6 Jury instructions on the adverse inference rule are permissible in federal court when there
is an "unexplained failure or refusal of a party... to produce

6.

2 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALs AT COMMON LAW § 285

rev. 1979).

(Chadbourn
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evidence that would tend to throw light on the issues."7 The
adverse inference rule must be predicated on the existence of
certain factors:
(1) it appears that the documentary evidence exists or existed; (2) the suppressing party has possession or control of the
evidence; (3) the evidence is available to the suppressing
party, but not to the party seeking production; (4) it appears
that there has been actual suppression or withholding of
evidence.'
Whether a corporation is within the control of a party to litigation, whether discovery of foreign evidence may be compelled,
whether the Hague Evidence Convention procedures provide an
effective alternative, and whether a party may be sanctioned for
the failure to produce evidence located abroad for discovery are
all integral components of an evaluation of the availability of the
adverse inference doctrine. As a result, the analysis of the availability and scope of a potential adverse inference instruction will
be organized in a four-part approach.
The first section of this Note will examine the factors that
determine whether a third party is sufficiently controlled by a
litigant to require it to comply with domestic discovery requests.
The second section will examine the procedures and tests that
courts use to determine the propriety of ordering discovery of
evidence located abroad in spite of restrictive foreign nondisclosure statutes. Section three will then examine the role of the
Hague Evidence Convention, its procedures for foreign discovery,
and whether domestic litigants must resort to these procedures.
Finally, section four will examine the availability and applicability of the adverse inference doctrine in situations involving nonproduction due to foreign illegality. This section also will ad-

7. Gumbs v. International Harvester, Inc., 718 F.2d 88, 96 (3d Cir. 1983); see 3
EDWARD J. DEv1TT ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 72.16 (4th
ed. 1987).

8. Evans v. Robbins, 897 F.2d 966, 970 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 156(2) (1964)); see also Spesco, Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 719 F.2d 233, 239
(7th Cir. 1983) (holding that in the absence of evidence alleging "any intentional acts
of misconduct by Spesco to conceal or destroy any relevant evidence . . .the district
court committed no error by refusing to read [an instruction allowing the presump-

tion of adverse evidence] to the jury").
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dress contemporary criticism of the doctrine and set forth a
working model for utilization of a proposed approach.
CORPORATE CONTROL OF THIRD PARTY DEPOSITORIES
A determination of whether a third party in possession of
evidence is within the control of a party to domestic litigation is
essential to a party's ability to either compel discovery or receive
an adverse inference instruction.9 In general, a party must only
produce evidence for disclosure if it is "available,"' ° or within
its "control."" This qualification becomes quite significant when
the parties to litigation have evidence in the custody of subsidiaries and related affiliates
that are not parties to the litigation
12
and are located abroad.
The ownership of all or most of the stock in a related corporation is one of the most common methods by which one corporation controls another. 3 Indeed, the ability to establish control
of a subsidiary is greatly increased when it is wholly owned and
managed by the parent. Ownership, however, is not dispositive
of the control issue, and even wholly owned subsidiaries often
are not considered under the control of the parent." Conversely, courts have noted that, at least in the context of jurisdiction,
control may be present even when a related corporation owns no
stock of the other corporate entity. 5 Because stock ownership
is not dispositive of the control issue, courts must consider a
variety of factors when determining whether a corporate party to
litigation has sufficient influence over an affiliate or subsidiary,
effectively controlling it.
The test for determining whether an American court can order
an American parent corporation to produce the documents of its
foreign subsidiary was delineated in In re Investigation of World

9. See DEVITT ET AL., supra note 7, § 72.16.
CIV. P. 33(a).
11. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(2).
12. See BORN & WESTIN, supra note 1, at 355.
13. Flank Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 277 F. Supp. 357, 362-63 (D. Colo. 1967).
14. See id. at 363.

10. FED. R.

15. Superior Coal v. Rubrkohle, A.G., 83 F-R-D. 414, 421 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (noting
that "ownership of less than half of the stock is no talisman") (citing United States
v. Watcuakers of Switzerland Info. Ctr., 133 F. Supp. 40, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1955)).
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Arrangements16 :
[I]f a corporation has power, either directly or indirectly,
through another corporation or series of corporations, to elect
a majority of the directors of another corporation, such corporation may be deemed a parent corporation and in control of
whose directors it has the power to elect to
the corporation
17
office.

In Societe Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et
Commerciales, SA. v. McGranery,8 the district court held that
the plaintiff, a Swiss corporation, had control of its Swiss-based
bank. 9 After an evaluation of the corporate affiliations of the
two partners, the court stated that an "interlocked web of corporate organization, management and finance" led to the conclusion that the "fundamental identity" of the partners was sufficient to support a finding of control.2" As the language of the
preceding cases suggests, whether one corporate entity controls
another ultimately rests upon findings of fact.2 ' The factual
inquiry, however, searches beyond corporate formalities and organization to determine the actual balance between the two
entities.Y
The factors discussed in jurisdictional inquiries are especially
valuable in the discovery context, in which exertion of influence
and interlocking interests are also pertinent indicia of control
and availability. A thoughtful inquiry considers whether the parent corporation and its subsidiary or affiliate have common officers and directors,' a common marketing image, 4 a common

16. In re Investigation of World Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280 (D.D.C. 1952).
17. Id. at 285.
18. 111 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1953), modified sub nor. Societe Internationale v.

Brownell, 225 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 937 (1956).
19. Id. at 442.
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1145 (N.D. ill.
1979).
22. See id. (noting that control "rests on a determination of whether the defendant
has practical and actual managerial control over, or shares such control with, its
affiliate, regardless of the formalities of corporate organization").
23. See Tokyo Boeki (USA), Inc. v. SS Navarino, 324 F. Supp. 361, 366 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
24. Call Carl, Inc. v. British Petroleum Oil Corp., 391 F. Supp. 367, 374 (D. Md.
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use of trademark or logo,2 common use of employees," an interchange of managerial and supervisory personnel,27 or an integrated sales system.2" Other factors include "whether the related corporation performs business duties and functions which
the principal corporation would normally transact through its
' whether the related corporation
own agents or departments,"29
acts as a "marketing arm" of the principal,"0 whether the related corporation acts as an exclusive distributor,31 and whether
the officers of the related3 2 corporation receive instructions from
the principal corporation.
It is not necessary to "pierce the corporate veil" to establish
that evidence requested for discovery is available and within the
control of the party to the litigation.' In Hubbard v.
Rubbermaid, Inc.," the plaintiff, Hubbard, argued that
Rubbermaid, by failing to produce relevant documents from its
two wholly owned subsidiaries, had not produced all available
documents within its control.35 The court, without piercing the
corporate veil, held that "the nonparty status of the ...subsid-

iaries [did] not shield their documents from production" and that
the "crucial factor" was that "the documents must be in the
custody, or under the control of, a party to the case.""
In Alimenta, the defendant, Anheuser-Busch, was involved in

1975), affd in part and rev'd in part, 554 F.2d 623 (4th Cir. 1977); SCM Corp. v.
Brother Int'l Corp., 316 F. Supp. 1328, 1332 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
25. Audio Warehouse Sales, Inc. v. United States Pioneer Elecs. Corp., 1975 Trade
Cas. (CCH)
60,213, at 65,832 (D.D.C.), vacated, 1975 Trade Cas.
60,293 (D.D.C.
1975).
26. Id.
27. Tokyo Boeki, 324 F. Supp. at 366.
28. Sunrise Toyota, Ltd. v. Toyota Motor Co., 55 F.R.D. 519, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
29. Superior Coal v. Ruhrkohle, A.G., 83 F.R.D. 414, 421 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
30. Call Carl, Inc. v. British Petroleum Oil Corp., 391 F. Supp. 367, 374-75 (D.
Md. 1975).
31. SCM Corp. v. Brother Intl Corp., 316 F. Supp. 1328, 1333 (S.D.N.Y. 1970);
United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Info. Ctr., 133 F. Supp. 40, 49
(S.D.N.Y. 1955).
32. In re Siemens & Halske, A.G., 155 F. Supp. 897, 898 (SD.N.Y. 1957).
33. See Alimenta (USA) v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., 99 F.R.D. 309, 313 (N.D. Ga.
1983).
34.

78 F.R.D. 631 (D. Md. 1978).

35. Id. at 636.
36. Id. at 637.
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a dispute over the quality of peanuts purchased by Alimenta
USA from Alimenta BV and shipped to the United States for
resale to Anheuser-Busch." Noting that "the crucial factor is
that the documents must be in the custody, or under the control
of, a party to the case," the court observed that the "Alimenta
subsidiaries acted 'as one' in the transaction at issue in this
case."3 9 The court refuted the argument that control is frustrated by separate corporate identities by utilizing this concept of
transactional identity to estop Alimenta USA from asserting
that it did not control relevant documents in the possession of
Alimenta BV.4 ° Transactional identity should not be seen as a
determinative factor of control. Like the other factors discussed
above, it serves only as further indicia of control between corporate entities. Transactional behavior, however, is highly indicative of corporate relationships and, in certain circumstances, a parent corporation's exercise of control within the context
of the transaction at issue may be sufficient to support a finding that documents and evidence related to that transaction
are available.
In In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation,4 1 Noranda was party
to the antitrust suit, although it did not itself own uranium or
any uranium-producing properties.4 2 Noranda did, however,
own 43.8% of the common shares of Kerr-Addison Mines, Ltd., a
Canadian corporation that owned a ninety percent interest in a
uranium-producing mine in Canada.43 The court accepted
Noranda's arguments that it should not be forced to produce
evidence in the custody of Kerr-Addison, observing that "[wlhile
a minority of the directors of Kerr-Addison are also officers of
Noranda, Kerr-Addison keeps its own books and records and
holds its own corporate meetings separate and apart from any
other company."" Significantly, the balance of Kerr-Addison

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Alimenta, 99 F.R.D. at 310.
Id. at 313 (relying on Rubbermaid, 78 F.R.D. at 637).
Id.
See id.
480 F. Supp. 1138 (NDl. MII.1979).
Id. at 1152.
Id.
Id.
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shares were publicly traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange and
were owned by more than 11,000 shareholders.45 The combination of Noranda's minority stock ownership and the fact that the
balance of the shares was not owned by an entity related to
Noranda was interpreted as evidence that Kerr-Addison retained
sufficient control over its business affairs to negate any inference that it was under the control of Noranda."
In the same case, however, the court required Rio U.S. to
produce evidence in the custody of Rio Canada.47 The court noted "that Rio U.S. and Rio Canada ...

operated as a single func-

tional unit in all aspects of their uranium business." 8 Both
"shar[ed] an interlocking structure of corporate directors, officers, and executive and administrative personnel who... managed the... activities of both corporations." 9 Rio U.S. argued
for this holding, relying on cases involving a corporation's liability for a related corporation's actions." The court, however, distinguished the prerequisites to a corporation's liability for related and affiliated corporations, noting the "crucial distinction
between ability to compel production of documents and liability
for a subsidiary's acts."5 ' Explaining that control for the purposes of document production could be supported without a finding of managerial control, the court again utilized the concept of
transactional identity to disregard the corporate "formalities"
that separated the two corporations.52 Although Rio U.S. was
the wholly owned subsidiary of an intermediate corporation
that was in turn wholly owned by Rio Canada, the significant
and consistent focus of judicial investigations regarding a parent corporation's control over a related or affiliate corporation
centers53 on the substance, not the form, of the intercorporate
nexus.

45. Id.
46. See id.
47. Id. at 1153.
48. Id. at 1152.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1153.
51. Id. (emphasis added).
52. Id.
53. See K.J. Schwartzbaum, Inc. v. Evans, Inc., 44 F.R.D. 589, 592 (S.).N.Y.
1968).
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In Erone Corp. v. Skouras Theatres Corp.,' Skouras had a
part ownership interest in another corporate entity, not unlike
the relationship between Noranda and Kerr-Addison.55 In
Erone, however, Skouras also had a relationship with the other
joint owner.5" The court noted that the request for production
was reasonable and relevant to the litigation," charged
Skouras with control of the evidence in the custody of the related company, 5 and observed that joint ownership and an "interlocking relationship" with the other owner made information in
the possession of one "available" to the other.59
The cases discussed in this section demonstrate that corporate
control is an extremely malleable concept capable of manipulation based upon the facts presented to the court. A significant
amount of case law and scholarly writing addresses control issues in the discovery context, and this Note attempts only to
identify some of the factors pertinent to the analysis. Control
over the third party for discovery purposes, however, is an essential prerequisite to the utilization of the adverse inference
doctrine.6"
DISCOVERY OF EVIDENCE LOCATED ABROAD AND SUBJECT TO
NONDISCLOSURE STATUTES

Because the use of the adverse inference doctrine is within the
discretionary power of the trial court,6 a determination of
whether discovery of evidence located abroad may be ordered is
also an essential prerequisite. A court has unquestioned jurisdiction to order a party litigant or a subpoenaed witness to appear
and produce documents, wherever located, that are within the
control of the party or witness.6' Societe Internationalepour

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
Law

22 F.R.D. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
Id. at 500.
Id.
Id. at 497.
Id. at 498.
Id. at 500.
See infra notes 192-97 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 242-43 and accompanying text.
Donald L. Roth, Subpoena of Documents Located in Foreign Jurisdiction Where
of Situs Prohibits Removal, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 295 (1962) (citing Societe
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Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, SA. v. Rogers
6 3 remains the leading case discussing
(Societe Internationale)
an American court's ability to order the production of documents
located abroad.64
In Societe Internationale, a Swiss holding company brought
suit under the Trading with the Enemy Act to recover assets
that the United States government had seized during World
War HI.65 At an early stage in the litigation, the government
moved under Rule 34 for an order requiring the holding company to produce documents held by its bank in Switzerland.6
The plaintiff sought relief from production on the ground that
disclosure of the required bank records would violate Swiss penal laws and subject those responsible for disclosure to criminal
sanctions.67 Upon plaintiffs failure to comply with the awarded
production order, the district court dismissed the complaint
after holding that the plaintiff had control over the bank records, that the records might prove a deciding factor in the suit,
and that Swiss law did not provide an adequate excuse for
noncompliance.68
On certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed the issuance of the
production order 69 but reversed the dismissal of the action.7 °
The Court identified three factors that influenced its decision
that have since become the backbone of current investigatory
analysis of the propriety of production orders for foreign evidence.7 First, a court should consider and facilitate the
strength of American interests as identified by statute.72 SecInternationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, SA. v. McGranery,
111 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1953), modified sub nom. Societe Internationale pour
Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Brownell, 225 F.2d 532 (D.C.
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 937 (1956)).
63. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
64. Timothy G. Smith, Note, Discovery of Documents Located Abroad in U.S. Antitrust Litigation: Recent Developments in the Law Concerning the Foreign Illegality
Excuse for Non-Production, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 747, 749 (1974).
65. Societe Internationale, 357 U.S. at 198-99.
66. Id. at 199-200.
67. Id. at 200.
68. Id. at 201.
69. Id. at 206.
70. Id. at 213.
71. Id. at 201, 204-05, 209.
72. Id. at 204 ("Mhe problem before us requires consideration of the policies un-
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ond, a court should replace the normal discovery standard of
relevance with a higher standard that inquires whether the
requested documents are crucial to the resolution of a key
issue in the litigation.73 Third, the Court indicated that a
party's good faith attempt to comply with a production order, to
obtain a waiver, or otherwise to achieve compliance is a valid
consideration."4
Societe Internationaleis cited invariably by both sides in prohibited discovery cases for either the proposition that liability
under a foreign nondisclosure law is no excuse for noncompliance with a validly issued discovery order or the assertion that
dismissal or similarly harsh sanctions should not be issued
when the party's good faith inability to comply is due to foreign
penal laws that forbid compliance.
DeterminingForeign Illegality
The first step in any evaluation of an offered excuse of foreign
illegality is a determination of whether the proffered law in fact
prohibits disclosure. 76 The party relying on the foreign law as
an excuse bears the burden of demonstrating to the trial court
that a statute bars compliance with a particular discovery request. 77 The party resisting discovery meets this burden only

when it has "provide[d] the Court with information of sufficient
particularity and specificity to allow the Court to determine
whether the discovery sought is indeed prohibited by foreign
derlying the Trading with the Enemy Act.").
73. Id. at 201 ("[S]uch records might prove to be crucial in the outcome of this
litigation .. . ."); id. at 205 ("[Rlecords might have a vital influence upon this litigation .... ).
74. Id. at 209 ("[Wie must dispose of this case on the basis of the findings of
good faith . .

").

75. Smith, supra note 64, at 750 (citing United States v. First Nat'l City Bank,
396 F.2d 897, 900-01 (2d Cir. 1968); In re Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611,
613 (2d Cir. 1962)).
1984). The court
76. Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 510 (NJ). Ill.
added: "Even where there is no conflict with a foreign law, courts are well advised
to proceed cautiously any time they order discovery involving activity within another
country." Id. at 510 n.9.
77. Alfadda v. Fenn, 149 F.RD. 28, 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (citing United States v.
Vetco, Inc., 691 F.2d 1281, 1289 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981); Roberts v. Heim, 130 F.R.D. 430, 436 (NfD. Cal. 1990)).
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law.""8 Although the burden to establish that a conflict with a
foreign nondisclosure law rests on the party resisting discovery,
the court may examine all relevant materials when making its
determination, regardless of whether the materials were submitted by a party or were admissible under the Federal Rules of
Evidence.79 As the determination concerning the law of a foreign country is a question of law, it is "'freely reviewable
[on
80
appeal] and is not limited by the "clearly erroneous" test.'"
Often, however, the import of the statute in question will be
clear, and a trial court may simply take judicial notice of its
prohibition of disclosure and the conflict with American discovery procedures.8 ' Accordingly, the degree to which litigants
must battle the issue of foreign law prohibition necessarily varies with the specificity of the statute in82question and the discovery philosophy of the foreign sovereign.
The Balance Approach
Generally, courts now agree that they must balance competing
interests in determining whether foreign illegality should preclude the issuance of a production order and that the result in
each case will turn on the particular circumstances.' The first
78. Id. (citing Ohio v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 570 F.2d 1370, 1374 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978); Compagnie Francaise d'Assurance pour le Commerce Exterieur v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 105 F.R.D. 16, 24-25 (S.).N.Y. 1984)).
79. FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1 ("The court, in determining foreign law, may consider any
relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a
party or admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court's determination
shall be treated as a ruling on a question of law.").
80. United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d 341, 344 (7th Cir.
1983) (quoting 9 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2446 (1971) (alterations in original)).
81. See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d
840, 855 (1981) (concluding that broad doctrinal differences in discovery procedures would result in the violation of West German sovereignty should discovery
be ordered).
82. See, e.g., Roth, supra note 62, at 296-97 (discussing (1) statutes that prevent
the removal of original business documents, (2) statutes designed to protect the
confidential nature of business records, and (3) statutes prohibiting the removal of
both originals and copies of business records if the removal is in response to the
order of any agency of a foreign sovereign).
83. United States v. Vetco, Inc., 691 F.2d 1281, 1288 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1098 (1981); In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d
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courts to address these issues used the balancing test set forth
in the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States section 40.84 Subsequent drafts of the Restatement have addressed the issue of the foreign illegality excuse for
nonproduction more directly,' but the vast majority of federal

992, 997 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Field (In re Grand Jury Proceedings),
532 F.2d 404, 407 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976); Trade Dev. Bank v.
Continental Ins. Co., 469 F.2d 35, 41 (2d Cir. 1972); Alfadda v. Fenn, 149 F.R.D. 28,
34 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Minpeco, S.A. v. ContiCommodity Servs., Inc., 116 F.R.D. 517,
522 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1145 (N.D.
Ill. 1979).
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §

40 (1965) (entitled "Limitations on Exercise of Enforcement Jurisdiction") [hereinafter
Section 40 Test].

85. For example, RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES (REVISED) § 420(2) (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1982), states:
If disclosure of information located outside the United States is prohibited by a law or regulation of the state in which the information or
prospective witness is located, or by the state of nationality of the prospective witness,
(a) the person to whom the order is directed may be required
by the court to make a good faith effort to secure permission from
the foreign authorities to make the information available;
(b) the court may not ordinarily impose the sanction of contempt, dismissal, or default on the party that has failed to comply
with the order for production, except in cases of deliberate concealment or removal of information or of failure to make a good
faith effort in accordance with paragraph (a);
(c) the court may, in appropriate cases, make findings of fact
adverse to a party that has failed to comply with the order for
production, even if that party has made a good faith effort to
secure permission from the foreign authorities to make the information available and that effort has been unsuccessful.
In addition, the Restatement (Third) states:
If disclosure of information located outside the United States is prohibited by a law, regulation, or order of a court or other authority of the
state in which the information or prospective witness is located, or of the
state of which a prospective witness is a national,
(a) a court or agency in the United States may require the
person to whom the order is directed to make a good faith effort
to secure permission from the foreign authorities to make the
information available;
(b) a court or agency should not ordinarily impose sanctions
of contempt, dismissal, or default on a party that has failed to
comply with the order for production, except in cases of deliberate
concealment or removal of information or of failure to make a
good faith effort in accordance with paragraph (a);
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cases still consistently utilize the Section 40 Test.8" Although
the application of the Section 40 Test has varied among the
federal circuits, virtually every circuit that has addressed the
foreign illegality excuse for nonproduction has recognized that
its factors provide "a useful starting place for the court's analysis."" The disagreements among the circuits focus not so much
on which factors trial courts should evaluate but on the significance of each factor and the standards that courts should apply
when evaluating such amorphous factors as "good faith" and
"importance. " '
The Section 40 Test was not designed to function as a rigid
formulaic device to determine the propriety of a production order. Rather, it was promulgated in recognition of the necessity of
an ad hoc factual inquiry balancing the competing interests of
comity present in transnational discovery. 9 The -Section 40
Test requires consideration of:
(a) vital national interests of each of the states,

(c) a court or agency may, in appropriate cases, make findings of fact adverse to a party that has failed to comply with the
order for production, even if that party has made a good faith
effort to secure permission from the foreign authorities to make
the information available and that effort has been unsuccessful.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
442(2) (1986).
86. In the Second Circuit, see United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1033-34 (2d
Cir. 1985); Trade Dev. Bank, 469 F.2d at 41 (alluding to factors set forth in the Restatement); Alfadda, 149 F.R.D. at 34; Minpeco, 116 F.R.D. at 522; SEC v. Banca
Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). In the Fifth Circuit, see
Field, 532 F.2d at 407. In the Seventh Circuit, see United States v. First Nat'l Bank
of Chicago, 699 F.2d 341, 345 (7th Cir. 1983); Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101
F.R.D. 503, 512 (N.D. Ill.1984). In the Ninth Circuit, see Vetco, 691 F.2d at 1288.
In the Tenth Circuit, see Ohio v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 570 F.2d 1370, 1373 (10th
Cir. 1978); In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d at
997.
87. Graco, 101 F.R.D. at 512; see supra note 86.
88. Compare In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1154 (N.D. Ill.
1979) ("whether the requested documents are crucial to the determination of a key
issue in the litigation") with Vetco, 691 F.2d at 1290 (whether the "documents
sought are the type of records relevant" to an issue in the litigation).
89. David E. Teitelbaum, Strict Enforcement of ExtraterritorialDiscovery, 38 STAN.
L. REV. 841, 854-56 (1986) (discussing the abandonment of early Second Circuit
decisions utilizing a "pure comity" approach to whether discovery sanctions should be
ordered in favor of the Section 40 Test, which had been commonly prescribed for
conflicting interests in international law).
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(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would impose upon the
person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take
place in the territory of the other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either
state can reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state.90
Courts have characterized the first two factors as far more important than the last three.9 In keeping with Societe
Internationale'srequirements, courts also evaluate the importance of the information and the requested documents to the
litigation, as well as the good or bad faith of the party resisting
discovery.2
Vital National Interests
There are three components to a court's analysis of the competing national interests at stake in a transnational discovery
dispute: (1) the nature and purpose of the foreign nondisclosure
statute, (2) the domestic interest in procuring discovery, and (3)
the interest and concern expressed by the foreign state. 3
Nature and Purpose
Foreign laws enacted expressly for the purpose of frustrating
American discovery of documents located abroad have been given little deference by courts evaluating discovery requests.94
90. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
STATES, supra note 84, § 40.

LAW OF THE

UNITED

91. Alfadda v. Fenn, 149 F.R.D. 28, 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Minpeco, S.A. v.
ContiCommodity Servs., Inc., 116 F.R.D. 517, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (citing Remington
Prods., Inc. v. North Am. Philips Corp., N.V., 107 F.RfD. 642, 652 (D. Conn. 1985);
SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F!.D. 111, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)).
92. United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1035 (2d Cir. 1985); Trade Dev. Bank
v. Continental Ins. Co., 469 F.2d 35, 41 (2d Cir. 1972); Alfadda, 149 F.R.D. at 34;
Minpeco, 116 F!R.D. at 523.
93. Morris E. Lasker, Discovery in the United States Courts Relating to Material
Subject to Foreign Secrecy Laws, C475 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 9 (1989), available in WL, TP-

ALL Database.
94. See, e.g., Minpeco, 116 F.R.D. at 524 (distinguishing bank secrecy laws with
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Similarly, courts have been prone to discount the foreign interest either when the party resisting discovery is a subsidiary of
an American corporation9 5 or when the nationality of the party
resisting discovery is not of the nation under whose laws it has
taken refuge. 6 Further, when a nation's nondisclosure law has
the effect of encouraging or fostering criminal activity, the court
will recognize a diminished foreign interest.97
Domestic Interest
In considering competing national interests, both the Second
and Ninth Circuits have distinguished actions brought by the
government from private suits because "[iun the latter situation,
'there is no opportunity for the executive branch to weigh the
foreign relations impact, nor any statement implicit in the filing
of the suit that that consideration has been outweighed."'98 The
distinction between actions brought by the government and
private suits is diminished when a private litigant brings an
action under a statute expressly authorizing private enforcement
suits.9 9 Congressional authorization of private enforcement
suits through legislation may well evince a strong national inter-

"the legitimate purpose of protecting commercial privacy" from "other foreign antidisclosure laws whose purposes courts have determined do not warrant deference");
Remington Prods., 107 F.R.D. at 651 (addressing a Dutch blocking statute designed
to frustrate discovery in U.S. antitrust cases); Compagnie Francaise d'Assurance pour
le Commerce Exterieur v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 105 F.R.D. 16, 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(addressing a French blocking statute designed solely to protect French business
from foreign discovery); In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1143
(NJ). Ill. 1979) (addressing Canadian, Australian, and South African statutes enacted
for the express purpose of impairing jurisdiction of U.S. courts).
95. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 614 (9th
Cir. 1976).
96. Alfadda, 149 F.R.D. at 34 n.6.
97. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1985) (concluding that
the Cayman Islands' policy against improper use of its business secrecy laws reduced
its interest in nondisclosure to an American grand jury).
98. United States v. Vetco, Inc., 691 F.2d 1281, 1289 n.9 (9th Cir.) (quoting
Timberlane Lumber Co., 549 F.2d at 613), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981);
Minpeco, 116 F.R.D. at 523 (noting that the court would "accord some deference to
the determination of the Executive Branch") (quoting Davis, 767 F.2d at 1035).
99. Minpeco, 116 F.R.D. at 523 (noting that antitrust, commodities, and racketeering statutes "have the effect-intended by Congress-of enforcing the law by
means of 'private attorney generals'[sic]) (citation omitted).
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est in adjudication."0
In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation'' demonstrates the inherent difficulty of balancing American interests against foreign
"blocking" statutes. In that case, Westinghouse brought an antitrust action against an alleged international marketing arrangement. 02 The court noted that several foreign governments had
enacted nondisclosure legislation in response to Westinghouse's
suit, each "aimed at nullifying the impact of American antitrust
legislation by prohibiting access" to certain documents.0 3 The
court went on to emphasize the fundamental importance of the
antitrust laws and the strength of congressional policies underlying the statute that formed the basis of the plaintiffs action. ' 4 Additionally, courts have recognized a strong national
interest in the enforcement of securities laws, the collection of
taxes, the prosecution of tax fraud, and the grand jury's power to
investigate crimes.0°
On a broader level, courts have recognized that "the United
States has a substantial interest in fully and fairly adjudicating
matters before its courts."'0 6 In Compagnie Francaise,the court
went on to note that the United States-has an important interest in preventing foreign litigants from obtaining an "unfair

100. Id. at 523-24 (noting that "it is difficult to imagine a private commercial lawsuit which could be more infused with the public interest"); see also Graco, Inc. v.
Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 513 (NJ). Ill. 1984) ("The United States patent laws
rely heavily for their enforcement on private infringement actions by patent holders,
and pre-trial discovery, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is an important
part of the system of private enforcement.").
101. 480 F. Supp. 1138 (NJ). Ill. 1979).
102. Id. at 1148.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1154 (citing United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610
(1972) ("[Antitrust laws] are as important to the preservation of economic freedom
and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms."); United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897,
903 (2d Cir. 1968) (stating that "[tihese laws have long been considered cornerstones
of this nation's economic policies")). Given the importance of the American interests,
the court in In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation observed that it was "simply impossible to judicially 'balance' these totally contradictory and mutually negating actions."
In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. at 1148.
105. United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1035 (2d Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).
106. Compagnie Francaise d'Assurance pour le Commerce Exterieur v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 105 F.R.D. 16, 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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advantage" when they sue in American courts and assert a foreign illegality excuse." 7 Such broad assessments of American
interest have led commentators to criticize the "overvaluation" of
American interests in the balancing approach.' 8
Interest and Concern Expressed by the Foreign State
"[A] foreign government's failure to express a view that the
disclosure at issue threatens its national interests militates
against a finding that strong national interests of the foreign
country are at stake."10 9 A court may discern the interest that
a foreign government has in opposing a discovery order from
submitted affidavits, from penalty provisions in nondisclosure
statutes, or from provisions allowing nationals to waive certain
restrictions. " 0°
Hardship
The hardship considerations as to the effect of noncompliance
with the foreign nondisclosure laws are also fact-specific. Section
40(b) was drafted to reflect the view of the Supreme Court in
Societe Internationale that "fear of criminal prosecution constitutes a weighty excuse for nonproduction, and this excuse is not
weakened because the laws preventing compliance are those of a
foreign sovereign.""' The Supreme Court's articulated reluctance to compel production in the face of foreign criminal sanctions provided further incentives for foreign governments to

107. Id.
108. Teitelbaum, supra note 89, at 863.
109. Alfadda v. Fenn, 149 F.R.D. 28, 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (citing United States v.
First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 904 (2d Cir. 1968) ("[Wlhen foreign governments . . . have considered their vital national interests threatened, they have not
hesitated to make known their objections . . . ."); Minpeco, SA. v. ContiCommodity
Servs., Inc., 116 F.R.D. 517, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (citing Davis, 767 F.2d at 1035
("The absence of any objection by the Cayman government to the subpoena and subsequent order . . . is significant.")); SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D.
111, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("The Swiss government. . . . though made expressly aware
of the litigation, has expressed no opposition.")).
110. Lasker, supra note 93, at *14-*16.
111. Teitelbaum, supra note 89, at 863 (quoting Societe Internationale pour
Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 211
(1958)).
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enact blocking legislation expressly designed to frustrate American discovery.' 12
Recognizing that many foreign nondisclosure statutes are
little more than tactical weapons designed to provide a foreign
litigant with "bargaining chips" to use in discovery negotiations," courts now consistently evaluate the likelihood of enforcement and the availability of defenses for compliance with
an American discovery order." 4 A court may also choose to recognize an obligation on the part of a foreign corporation with a
domestic presence to keep specified records in the United
States." 5 Finally,
where the party sought to be compelled to produce documents
in violation of foreign secrecy laws is merely a neutral source
of information, and not itself a target of a criminal investigation or an adverse party in litigation, some courts have found
the hardship to weigh more heavily in the balance. " 6

112. See id. at 863-64.
113. Compagnie Francaise d'Assurance pour le Commerce Exterieur v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 105 F.RD. 16, 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
114. See, e.g., Alfadda v. Fenn, 149 F.R.D. 28, 35 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("[P]rosecutions
under Art. 162 are commenced only upon complaint of the party injured by disclosure. Because a confidentiality order has been entered in this case, the likelihood
that the disclosure will be discovered or will cause injury is greatly reduced ....
[There is] no real threat of prosecution ....
"); Minpeco, S.A. v. ContiCommodity
Servs., Inc., 116 FR). 517, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("Consequently, it appears that the
likelihood of a successful defense to a Swiss prosecution based on Article 47 is highly speculative in the circumstances of these cases."); Remington Prods., Inc. v. North
Am. Philips Corp., N.V., 107 F.R.D. 642, 652 (D. Conn. 1985) ("Article 39 is a criminal statute, a fact found significant by the Supreme Court in Societe with respect to
the Swiss law involved there. As previously noted, however, no prosecution has ever
been pursued under Article 39. As in Banca, the availability . . . of a 'necessity' defense . . . diminishes the hardship. . . .") (citation omitted); Compagnie Francaise,
105 F.RD. at 30 ("[blocking statute] was never expected nor intended to be enforced
against French subjects"); SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111, 118
(S.D.N.Y. 1981). The court in Banca stated:
Not only may the particular bank involved obtain waivers from its customers to avoid prosecution, but Article 34 of the Swiss Penal Code contains a "State of Necessity" exception that relieves a person of criminal
liability for acts committed to protect one's own good, including one's
fortune . . . if one is not responsible for the danger .
Id.
115. See, e.g., United States v. Vetco, Inc., 691 F.2d 1281, 1289-90 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981).
116. Minpeco, 116 F.R.D. at 526-27 (citing United States v. First Nat'l Bank of
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This factor, however, seems more endemic to the control analysis than to the consideration of hardship.. given the fact that
a finding of absolute neutrality would favor preclusion of the
production order at a much earlier stage than the balancing
test.""
The hardship review may be seen as being more concerned
with the probability of criminal and civil penalties than with the
harshness of any particular statute. Therefore, in In re Westinghouse Electric Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, the court
was unpersuaded by relatively severe penalties set forth in the
Canadian nondisclosure statute."9 The district court concluded
that the penalties under the Canadian law were not an adequate
excuse for the nonproduction of evidence. 2 ° The court found
significant the fact that neither party had diligently sought to
comply with its order nor made a good faith showing of inability
to comply by seeking
a timely exemption from the Canadian
2
nondisclosure law.' '
Location, Nationality, and Expectation
As noted above, courts have characterized the first two factors
of the Restatement test as far more important than the last
three.' 2' At least in part, this stems from the simple fact that
the Restatement was not designed for use in the discovery context and that factors such as the location of the required conduct
merely describe the nature of the problem that the court is
addressing." Although courts may buttress balancing decisions by observing that the last three factors "tip in favor" of the

Chicago, 699 F.2d 341, 346 (7th Cir. 1983)).
117. See supra notes 9-60 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
119. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992, 996
(10th Cir. 1977). The Canadian statute provided for a penalty of $5,000 or two years
imprisonment or both. Id. Upon an indictment and conviction, however, the penalty
could be as high as $10,000 or five years imprisonment or both. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
123. Teitelbaum, supra note 89, at 858 n.64.
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favored party,' it is now settled that the last three factors of
the Section 40 Test are not a part of the annunciated balancing
approach.'
Importance to the Litigation
In Societe Internationale, the Supreme Court implied that
courts should use a heightened standard of "materiality" for
discovery involving a foreign illegality excuse for nonproduction. 26 The Court did not define this standard clearly, however,1 27 and subsequent lower court decisions have articulated
the standard differently.' Regardless of the standard applied,
the importance to the litigation of the information sought by the
requesting party is clearly a factor to be considered.
Courts consistently have refused to require production when
the information sought is largely cumulative of records already
produced. 9 The character of the action at bar may also bear
on the importance of the requested discovery. One commentator

124. SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 FiR.D. 111, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
125. Minpeco, SA. v. ContiCommodity Servs., Inc., 116 F.RID. 517, 522-23 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (articulating the "principal' factors as vital national interests, hardship, importance, and good faith).
126. Smith, supra note 64, at 751 (citing Societe Internationale pour Participations
Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 200-01 (1958)).
127. The Societe Internationale decision left the standard unresolved. The Court
noted that "the Government alleged that the records sought were relevant' but
went on to acknowledge the district court's conclusion that "such records might
prove to be crucial in the outcome of this litigation." Societe Internationale, 357 U.S.
at 200-01.
128. See, e.g., United States v. Vetco, Inc., 691 F.2d 1281, 1290 (9th Cir.) ("relevant'), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981); Trade Dev. Bank v. Continental Ins. Co.,
469 F.2d 35, 41 (2d Cir. 1972) ("relative unimportance of the information' as a factor); Alfadda v. Fenn, 149 F.R.D. 28, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("directly relevant");
Minpeco, 116 F.R.D. at 527-28 ("may be crucial to the litigation'); Compagnie
Francaise d'Assurance pour le Commerce Exterieur v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 105
F.RI). 16, 32 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (rejecting a "vital" test and finding "only that the
requested documents are relevant"); Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503,
515-16 (N.D. IlM. 1984) (eschewing a precise standard while recognizing "the significance of this factor"); In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1146 (Nfl.
IlM. 1979) ("whether the requested documents are crucial to the resolution of a key
issue in the litigation').
129. Vetco, 691 F.2d at 1290 (citing In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992, 999 (10th Cir. 1977); Trade Dev. Bank, 469 F.2d at 4041)).
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has noted that "the heart of any American antitrust case is the
discovery of business documents. Without them, there is virtually no case."13 ° This holds exceptionally true when a party alleges an antitrust conspiracy that has apparently taken deliberate
and elaborate steps to cloak its activities.' 3 ' Cases pursuing
private rights of action of a vital domestic interest may have an
advantage should documents or other evidence located abroad
become necessary to maintain a case or establish a defense.
Good Faith
As noted above, the Court in Societe Internationale emphasized the importance of the good faith requirement, strongly
implying a requirement that a party seek a waiver of the prohibiting law and noting that the courting of legal impediments
would warrant judicial notice.'32 In fact, the issue of good faith
was the dispositive factor behind the Supreme Court's decision
not to impose sanctions in Societe Internationalefor noncompliance with the valid discovery order." Although courts should
evaluate a party's good faith attempts to cooperate with discovery throughout the litigation process, the good faith evaluation
as expressed in Societe Internationaletends consistently to focus
on, and is applied by the courts in, the postproduction order context. 3 4 The very nature of a good faith examination into the
nonproducing party's reasons for nondisclosure presupposes the
existence of a production order.' Essentially, the good faith
evaluation concedes the validity of a foreign nondisclosure statute and "requires [the nonproducing party] to demonstrate that
the blame for nonproduction lies entirely with the foreign sovereign. ' Accordingly, the good faith evaluation may be seen

130. In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. at 1155 (citing Smith, supra note
64).
131. Id.
132. Societe Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v.
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 208-09 (1958).
133. Id. at 209.
134. See Lenore B. Browne, Note, ExtraterritorialDiscovery: An Analysis Based on
Good Faith, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1320, 1340-50 (1983).
135. See id.
136. Teitelbaum, supra note 89, at 871.
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as distinct from the Restatement balancing. If, after consideration of the factors noted in the Restatement approach, it appears that the burden of producing the evidence should remain
on the party with control over the evidence, the good faith evaluation will focus on whether the failure to produce the evidence
was justified."7
The good faith evaluation is also fact-specific. The district
court in McGrath provided a nonexhaustive list of factors to be
considered." These factors include whether the nonproducing
party applied for permission to produce the documents, whether
the nonproducing party exhausted all efforts with the executive
branch of the foreign country, whether the nondisclosure
statute's prohibitions are subject to waiver, whether the foreign
country's actions in the case have beeni consistent with their own
law, and whether the nonproducing party had sought any available judicial redress. 39
In addition to examining a nonproducing party's good faith
efforts to comply with a production order, evidence of bad faith
based upon a party's conduct prior to the litigation and upon
conduct after the onset of litigation can weigh against the
nonproducing party. 4 ' Purposefully locating documents in a
jurisdiction that prohibits disclosure in anticipation of litigation
could lead a court to find that "one who deliberately courted
legal impediments to production... cannot... be heard to
assert its good faith after this expectation was realized."' Bad
faith has been found not only in a party's purposeful utilization
of a foreign jurisdiction's nondisclosure policy but also in actions
Undoubtedly, a good
taken to advance blocking statutes.'

137. See Roth, supra note 62, at 305 (citing factors analogous to those of the
Restatement).
138. Societe Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, SA. v.
McGrath, 11 F.R.D. 294, 296 (D.D.C. 1951); Roth, supra note 62, at 305 n.51.
139. McGrath, 11 F.R.D. at 296; Roth, supra note 62, at 305 n.51.
140. Browne, supra note 134, at 1343.
141. Societe pour Participations Industrielles et Comynerciales, SA. v. Rogers, 357
U.S 197, 208-09 (1958).
142. Browne, supra note 134, at 1344 (citing SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana,
92 F.RI). 111, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); General Atomic Co. v. Exxon Nuclear Co., 90
F.R.D. 290, 296-99 (S.D. Cal. 1981) (storing documents abroad with expectation that
they would thereby under foreign law be unavailable for discovery in anticipated
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faith evaluation overlaps with an inquiry into the availability of
alternative means of compliance with discovery and discovery orders. A party's willingness to pursue and proffer substantially
equivalent alternative means for obtaining requested information is highly pertinent to the court's resolution of the issue.'
In the case of British nondisclosure laws, substantially equivalent alternative means are not readily available."' As noted,
the British "dispute with United States laws involves not only a
clash of antitrust jurisdiction and enforcement policies, but also
a strong difference in discovery philosophies." 45 Indeed, it appears that the only practical alternate means i'or obtaining the
requested information is the Hague Convention on the Taking of
Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters. 4 ' The availability, effectiveness, and optional aspects of this convention will
be discussed in the next section.
THE ROLE OF THE HAGUE EVIDENCE CONVENTION PROCEDURES
"In Societe Nationale IndustrielleAerospatiale v. United States
District Court,'4 7 the Supreme Court held that the Hague Convention in no way restricted district courts' discretion to apply
the Federal Rules to discovery requests for production of evidence located abroad."'4 The Supreme Court instructed that,

litigation in the United States)). In discussing In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F.
1979), the court in Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503
Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill.
(N.D. IlM.1984), noted that "[slome of the laws ... were enacted precisely as an
attempt to frustrate discovery in the uranium antitrust litigation, and possibly to
protect certain defendants not only from discovery, but even from an adverse determination of the merits of the litigation." Id. at 514.
143. See United States v. Vetco, Inc., 691 F.2d 1281, 1290 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1098 (1981); In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563
F.2d 992, 998 (10th Cir. 1977).
144. See Smith, supra note 64, at 769-70 (citing F.A. Mann, Anglo-American Conflict of InternationalJurisdiction, 13 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1460, 1463 (1964)).
145. Id. at 761 n.60.
146. Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, opened for signature, Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 12 I.L.M. 323 [hereinafter Hague Evidence Convention].
147. 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
148. Joshua 0. Stein, Subordinating the Hague Evidence Convention to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States
District Court, 21 CONN. L. REV. 167, 167 (1988) (footnote omitted) (citing Soci6t6
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in determining whether to require use of the Hague Evidence
Convention procedures or to permit discovery pursuant to the
Federal Rules, courts must consider (1) the particular facts of
each case, (2) the sovereign interests at issue, and (3) the
"likelihood that resort to [Convention] procedures [would] prove
effective."'
The Supreme Court derived the tripartite test
from the more general approach taken by the Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States.5 ° Although
"[leaving the determination to be made on a case-by-case basis
by the trial court, the Supreme Court advised that American
courts 'should exercise special vigilance to protect foreign litigants from the danger that unnecessary, or unduly burdensome,
151
discovery may place them in a disadvantageous position.""
In the years immediately following the Soci6tg Nationale decision, lower courts disagreed as to which party should bear the
burden of establishing which discovery procedure to utilize.'52
Presently, consensus states that a correct reading of Socidtd
Nationale requires that "[tlhe proponent of using the Hague
Convention has the burden of demonstrating the necessity for
those procedures." 5 3

Nationale, 482 U.S. 522).
149. Socidt6 Nationale, 482 U.S. at 544.
150. Id. at 544 n.28 (citing RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES (REVISED) § 437(1)(c) (Tentative Draft No. 7, 1986)). Section 437(1)(c)
provides:
In issuing an order directing production of information located abroad, a
court or agency in the United States should take into account the importance to the investigation or litigation of the documents or other information requested; the degree of specificity of the request; whether the information originated in the United States; the availability of alternative
means of securing the information; and the extent to which non-compliance with the request would undermine important interests of the United
States, or compliance with the request would undermine important interests of the state where the information is located.
Id.
151. In re Perrier Bottled Water Litig., 138 F.R.D. 348, 353 (D. Conn. 1991) (quoting Sociot6 Nationale, 482 U.S. at 546).
152. See, e.g., Benton Graphics v. Uddenhoim Corp., 118 F.R.D. 386 (D.N.J. 1987)
(stating that the burden is on the party seeking the use of the Hague Evidence
Convention procedures); Hudson v. Hermann Pfauter Gmbh & Co., 117 F.R.D. 33
(N.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that the burden is on the party opposing the use of the
Hague Evidence Convention procedures).
153. Doster v. Schenk A.G., 141 F.R.D. 50, 51 (M.D.N.C. 1991); see also Perrier,
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As the tripartite approach so closely resembles the analysis of
the previous section, this section will emphasize the differences
rather than reiterate a tautology of factor balancing. The particular facts of each case are to be weighed against the extent and
intrusiveness of the discovery sought, so as not to offend notions
of international comity.'54 A strong interest in litigating a dispute domestically, coupled with a finding that the party resisting discovery should have expected American litigation, favors
use of American discovery procedures. 55 Under the tripartite
test, a reasonable expectation that a foreign company's business
activities would subject it to American litigation may support a
finding that the nonproducing company would not be disadvantaged by compelled discovery.'5 6 As discussed above, American
interest in the successful resolution of antitrust suits is undisputed. Additionally, a court should consider a litigant's fear of
"abusive" discovery in light of "[tihe protective devices of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [that] are available to protect a
foreign defendant against abusive or unfair discovery."'5 7
The "particular facts" prong of the tripartite analysis is best
interpreted as an effort to obviate concerns that the domestic
litigant is seeking to take advantage of any "special problem
confronted by the foreign litigant on account of its nationality or
the location of its operations."'58 Cooperation with the foreign
litigant and narrowly tailored discovery requests weigh heavily
in favor of the domestic litigant's seeking discovery under the

138 F.R.D. at 354 ("[A] party who seeks the application of Convention procedures
rather than the Federal Rules bears the burden of persuading the trial court.") (citing Benton Graphics, 118 F.R.D. at 389); Rich v. KIS California, Inc., 121 F.R.D.
254, 258 (M.D.N.C. 1988) ("[D]efendants have not met their burden of showing that
plaintiffs should be required to resort to discovery via the Hague Evidence Convention."); Haynes v. Kleinwefers, 119 F.R.D. 335, 337 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (stating that
defendant failed to show any compelling reason to proceed with discovery via the
Hague Convention procedures).
154. See Perrier, 138 F.R.D. at 354-55; Stein, supra note 148, at 176 & n.48.
155. Schenk, 141 F.R.D. at 52.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 53.
158. Haynes v. Kleinwefers, 119 F.R.D. 335, 337 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (quoting Soci4t6
Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale v. United States District Court, 482 U.S. 522,
547 (1987)).
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Federal Rules.'59
The sovereign interests prong tracks the approach described
earlier. One should note, however, that the party seeking to
employ the Hague Evidence Convention procedures must
identify specific reasons why specific discovery requests under
the Federal Rules would be obtrusive. 6 ° This requirement becomes all the more significant given the vastly different views
held by commercialized nations regarding American antitrust,
securities, commodities, and patent jurisdiction and enforcement
policies, as well as discovery processes.'
Perhaps the most important prong of the tripartite analysis is
the likelihood that resort to Convention procedures would prove
effective.162 In terms of the effectiveness analysis, the "documents exception" rule permitting parties to the Hague Evidence
Convention not to execute Letters of Request issued for the
purposes of obtaining pretrial discovery of documents stands as
an intransigent roadblock to effective discovery of evidence located abroad.' This particular exception, which the British delegation drafted, has been invoked routinely.' The primary purpose of "[t]he pretrial discovery exception was ... to prevent

pretrial discovery of a 'fishing nature' or... 'the production of
documents not directly required by a foreign court."" 5 Al159. Id. at 337-38.
160. Benton Graphics v. Uddehoim Corp., 118 F.R-D. 386, 391 (D.N.J. 1987) ("These

'critical sovereign interests' are merely general reasons why Sweden prefers civil law
discovery procedures to the more liberal discovery permitted under the federal
rules.").
161. Cf. Smith, supra note 64, at 761 n.60 (noting the role of conflicting British
and Aierican discovery philosophies in antitrust disputes).
162. See Socidt6 Nationale, 482 U.S. at 542-43. The Court in Socidtd Nationale
observed:
In many situations the Letter of Request procedure authorized by the
Convention would be unduly time consuming and expensive, as well as
less certain to produce needed evidence than direct use of the Federal
Rules .... [The procedure also is] inconsistent with the overriding interest in the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination" of litigation in
our courts.

Id. (quoting FED. R. CIv. P. 1).
163. See Bernard H. Oxman, The Choice Between Direct Discovery and Other Means
of Obtaining Evidence Abroad: The Impact of the Hague Evidence Convention, 37 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 733, 771-79 (1983).
164. See id. at 771.

165. Id. at 773 (quoting D.M. Edwards, Taking Evidence Abroad in Civil or Corn-
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though courts have been reluctant to accept generalizations
regarding the cumbersome nature of the Hague Evidence Convention procedures,166 probable delays and increased costs often weigh against their use.167
The ability of a country to deny document discovery pursuant
to Convention procedures has been cited as a valid reason for
declining use of the Hague Evidence Convention.'68 Commentators agree that a party should not be forced to embark on a
quixotic journey to use the Hague Evidence Convention procedures if it becomes clear that cooperation will be refused.'6 9 Although a court's refusal to mandate the use of the Hague Evidence Convention procedures does not necessarily mean that direct discovery methods should be ordered, when an adverse
party has placed evidence abroad in anticipation of potential
litigation, the absence of good faith combined with a substantial
domestic interest will weigh in favor of the domestic litigant in
the adverse inference calculus.
AVAILABILITY AND APPLICABILITY OF THE DOCTRINE OF ADVERSE
INFERENCES TO THE NONDISCLOSURE DUE TO FOREIGN
ILLEGALITY SETTING

The doctrine of adverse inferences arose long before the advent of modern discovery procedures, "at a time when parties
had no means of compelling their opponents to produce... evi-

mercial Matters, 18 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 646, 650-51 (1969) (alterations in original)).
166. In re Perrier Bottled Water Litig., 138 F.R.D. 348, 355 (D. Conn. 1991)
(pointing out that delays may be due to lack of familiarity with Conventio!L procedures) (citing Hudson v. Hermann Pfanter Gmbh & Co., 117 F.RfD. 33, 38 (NfD.N.Y.
1987)).
167. Benton Graphics v. Uddeholm Corp., 118 F.R.D. 386, 391 (D.N.J. 1987). Considering the potential for delays should Convention procedures be utilized, the court
in Benton Graphics expressed typical concern:
[D]efendants' letter of request should be processed by the Swedish authorities in approximately two months. That is an approximation based
upon past history; there are certainly no guarantees. This case has already endured numerous delays and discovery should proceed apace....
[F]urther litigation undoubtedly spawned by their decision may bring
actual discovery to a standstill.

Id.
168. See Doster v. Schenk, 141 F.R.D. 50, 54-55 (M.D.N.C. 1991).
169. Oxman, supra note 163, at 782.
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dence."'70 The doctrine "supplied a necessary incentive for the
parties to present a full picture of the facts."'71 Today, in civil
litigation, the content of any proposed testimony or desired evidence is generally obtainable, reducing the need for such an
instruction. 7 2 In litigation involving evidence located abroad
and subject to foreign nondisclosure laws, however, the doctrine
of adverse inferences remains a valuable tool for either compelling disclosure or limiting the benefits to be achieved by foreign
secreting of evidence.'7 3
The Origins of the Adverse Inference Doctrine
The adverse inference doctrine for the nonproduction of evidence traces its roots to the eighteenth-century British case of
the Chimney Sweeper's Jewel. The case, Armory v.
Delamirie,'74 involved a chimney sweeper's boy who found a
jewel ring and brought it to the defendant, a goldsmith, for appraisal. The goldsmith's apprentice removed the gem and returned only the setting to the sweeper's boy.'75 In an action of
trover, the court directed the jury "that unless the defendant did
produce the jewel, and shew it not to be of the finest water, they
should presume the strongest against him, and make the value
of the best jewels [that could fit in the setting] the measure of
their damages."'76
The Supreme Court dealt with -the doctrine of adverse inferences in Clifton v. United States.'7 7 In Clifton, Justice Nelson
characterized the doctrine as an analog to the best evidence
rule 78 and acknowledged that the doctrine had applications to

170. Robert H. Stier, Jr., Revisiting the Missing Witness Inference-Quieting the
Loud Voice from the Empty Chair, 44 MD. L. REV. 137, 141 (1985).
171. Id.
172. Joseph M. Livermore, Absent Evidence, 26 ARIZ. L. REV. 27, 32 (1984).
173. Cf. Smith, supra note 64, at 757, 757 n.48, 758 (discussing the courts' use of
negative inferences of fact under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 to compel discovery of evidence located abroad and subject to foreign nondisclosure laws) (citing
Dorsey v. Academy Moving & Storage, Inc., 423 F.2d 858, 860-61 (5th Cir. 1970)).
174. 1 Strange 505, 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (1722).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 242 (1846).
178. Id. at 247. Recognizing the roots of the doctrine, Justice Nelson stated:

778

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:749

the nonproduction of evidence. 79
The adverse inference doctrine also has cognizable roots in the
spoliation doctrine and the maxim "Contra spoliatorem omnia
praesumuntur (All things are presumed against the destroyer).""'0 Under this doctrine,
a party's falsehood or other fraud in the preparation and
presentation of his cause, his fabrication or suppression of
evidence by bribery or spoliation, and all similar conduct is
receivable against him as an indication of his consciousness
that his case is a weak or unfounded one; and from that
the fact itself of the cause's
consciousness may be inferred
8
lack of truth and merit.' 1
Whatever its origins, the adverse inference doctrine for the.
nonproduction of evidence is perhaps best stated by Wigmore:
These inferences, to be sure, cannot fairly be made except
upon certain conditions; and they are also open always to
explanation by circumstances which make some other hypothesis a more natural one than the party's fear of exposure.
But the propriety of such an inference in general is not
doubted.
The nonproduction of evidence that would naturally have
been produced by an honest and therefore fearless claimant
permits the inference that its tenor is unfavorable to the

One of the general rules of evidence, of universal application, is, that the
best evidence of disputed facts must be produced of which the nature of
the case will admit. This rule, speaking technically, applies only to the
distinction between primary and secondary evidence; but the reason assigned for the application of the rule in a technical sense is equally applicable, and is frequently applied, to the distinction between the higher
and inferior degree of proof ....
Id.
179. Id. Justice Nelson explained:
The meaning of the rule is .. . that no evidence shall be admitted,
which, from the nature of the case, supposes still greater evidence behind . . . because the absence of the primary evidence raises a presumption, that, if produced, it would give a complexion to the case at least
unfavorable, if not directly adverse, to the interest of the party.
Id.
180. Stier, supra note 170, at 140 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1257 (5th ed.
1979)).
181. 2 WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 278.
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party's cause."

As recognized by Professor Livermore, the failure to produce
certain evidence amounts to an admission by conduct. 183As
this conduct is not intended as an assertion, there is no
hearsay problem under the Federal Rules of Evidence,' but
the evidentiary inferences follow an identical route." First,
the failure of a party to produce evidence in the litigation indicates the nonproducing party's belief that the evidence is adverse. 186 Next, the party's apparent belief that the evidence is
adverse allows an inference that the unproduced evidence is, in
fact, adverse.'
Application of the Adverse Inference Doctrine
The adverse inference doctrine is at the heart of several judicial applications involving the nonproduction of evidence. Adverse inferences may be drawn, under certain circumstances,
"when a party fails to call a witness whom that party would
ordinarily produce if the facts known by the witness were favorable to that party,"'" "from the destruction of evidence relevant to a case,"'89 from "[tihe production of weak evidence
when strong is available,"9 ' and when there exists an "unexplained failure or refusal of a party... to produce evidence that
would tend to throw light on the issues." 9 '
Although the prerequisites vary depending on whether the
adverse inferences are based upon a missing witness, spoliation,
weaker evidence, or the nonproduction of evidence, the underlying principles are the same. Before a court permits adverse
182. 2 id. § 285.
183. Livermore, supra note 172, at 29.
184. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).

185. Livermore, supra note 172, at 29.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. United States v. Ariza-Ibarra, 651 F.2d 2, 15 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
895 (1981).
189. Glover v. Bic Corp., 987 F.2d 1410, 1417 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Akiona v.
United States, 938 F.2d 158, 161 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 962 (1992)).
190. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226 (1939) (citing
Clifton v. United States, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 242, 247 (1846)).
191. Gumbs v. International Harvester, Inc., 718 F.2d 88, 96 (3d Cir. 1983).
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inferences, the proponent of the inference must establish that
the evidence or testimony that was not produced was controlled
by the nonproducing party,192 was peculiarly available to the
nonproducing party,193 would elucidate the transaction,'94
and was, in fact, actually withheld.' A court may apply the
doctrine either through the use of a jury instruction or through
arguments by counsel at closing.'96
For nonproduction of evidence, the adverse inference rule is
permissible when
(1) it appears that the documentary evidence exists or existed; (2) the suppressing party has possession or control of the
evidence; (3) the evidence is available to the suppressing
party, but not to the party seeking production; (4) it appears
that there has been actual suppression or withholding of
evidence."'
The party requesting an adverse inference instruction has the
burden of showing that the criteria have been satisfied. 9 ' The
adverse inference instruction is argumentative,'99 making the
trial court's decision to grant or deny a request for an adverse
inference instruction reviewable under an abuse of discretion
standard. 00 A court, however, should not preclude argument
regarding the inference when the case presents a significant
question on the failure to produce.'
192. United States v. Johnson, 562 F.2d 515, 517 (8th Cir. 1977).
193. United States v. Frost, 914 F.2d 756, 765 (6th Cir. 1990) (citing United States
v. Blakemore, 489 F.2d 193, 195 (6th Cir. 1973)).
194. Id.

195. Gumbs, 718 F.2d at 96 (citing 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 156(2) (1964)).
196. See infra notes 205-09 and accompanying text.
197. Evans v. Robbins, 897 F.2d 966, 970 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 156(2) (1964)).
198. Wilson v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 893 F.2d 1149, 1151 (10th Cir.
1990); Jones v. Otis Elevator Co., 861 F.2d 655, 659-60 (11th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Sutton, 732 F.2d 1483, 1492 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1157
(1985).
199. "[A jury] instruction is argumentative if it .. . singles out the testimony of
one witness while disregarding other relevant evidence .

. .

."

Vanskike v. ACF

Indus., Inc., 665 F.2d 188, 201-02 (8th Cir. 1981) (citing Systems, Inc. v. Bridge
Elecs. Co., 335 F.2d 465, 467 (3d Cir. 1964)), cert. denied sub noma. Saint Louis-S.F.
Ry. v. Vanskike, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982).
200. Sutton, 732 F.2d at 1492.
201. Chicago College of Osteopathic Medicine v. Fuller Co., 719 F.2d 1335, 1352-53
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What, then, is the adverse inference? One commentator has
noted that the inference "does not supply affirmative or substantive proof but merely affects the weight or credibility of the
evidence."" 2 In Felice v. Long Island Railroad, Judge Friendly
described the inference as one that "permit[s] the jury 'to give
the strongest weight to the evidence already in the case in favor
of the other side, and which has not been, but might have been,
effectively contradicted or explained by the absent [evidence]."'20 " The adverse inference doctrine is thus a self-limiting rule that acknowledges that the failure to produce does not
amount to substantive proof and therefore does not alter the
proof requirements in a particular case." 4 The adverse inference doctrine essentially strengthens a party's case that has
been disadvantaged by the nonproducing party's failure to cooperate with the trial court's search for truth.
One should note a distinction between argument and instruction. An argument involves counsel's analysis of all of the evidence and is not limited to those matters for which a jury instruction is required. Significantly, a jury instruction has the
weight of law, even if it only permits and does not require the
inference." 5 Counsel whose request for an instruction has been
denied may still retain the ability to argue the inference to the
jury in closing argument because the argument may be proper
even if the instruction is not.0 6 Wigmore noted that "the failure to produce is in evidence from the very nature of the situation, and therefore, when relevant..., may be referred to."207
(7th Cir. 1983) ("Questions as to the propriety of comment by counsel in argument
upon the failure to produce a witness rest largely in the discretion of the trial court,
but the court should not preclude such argument when the case presents a significant question on this point.").
202. Stier, supra note 170, at 148 (emphasis omitted).
203. Felice v. Long Island R.R., 426 F.2d 192, 195 n.2 (2d Cir. 1970) (quoting
Seligson, Morris & Neuburger v. Fairbanks Whitney Corp., 22 A.D.2d 625, 630 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1965)).
204. 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 245 (1964); Brown v. Maryland Casualty Co., 55
F.2d 159 (8th Cir. 1932) (using a prima facie case prerequisite for application of the
adverse inference doctrine).
205. Stier, supra note 170, at 168.
206. 75A Au. JUR. 2D Trial § 596 (1964).
207. Stier, supra note 170, at 166 (quoting 6 WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 1806)
(omission in original).
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The issue of relevance returns to the same question of fact discussed above-whether the party could have produced the evidence."' Once a fact is in evidence, counsel may argue inferences from the fact subject only to the duty to exercise good
faith." 9 The extent to which counsel may comment on the absence of certain evidence would seem to be a function of the
degree to which a party fails to explain satisfactorily the absence,2 1 ° fails to show that the evidence would have been cumulative,2 1 ' or fails to show that the evidence was equally
available to both parties.2 12
Criticism of the Adverse Inference Doctrine
Modern use of the adverse inference doctrine has not gone
uncriticized. First, the doctrine has been criticized as archaic in
the age of liberal discovery and a broad subpoena power that
makes all evidence "available" to all parties.1 ' Second, the
adverse inference arising from the nonproduction of evidence
may be objectionable in light of "the many reasons having
nothing to do with the content" of the evidence that might
prevent a party from producing it.2 "4 Third, the adverse inference instruction itself has been criticized as duplicative and
"not informative."21' 5
In discussing the continued validity of the missing witness
rule, a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit expressed a common criticism of the adverse inference doctrine:
It is not difficult to demonstrate how the evidentiary scheme
created by the Federal Rules of Evidence, as complemented

208. Id. at 167.
209. See, e.g., Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. 118, 125 (1893) (Brewer, J., dissenting).
210. Felice v. Long Island R.R., 426 F.2d 192; 194-95 (2d Cir. 1970).
211. In re Evangeline Refining Co., 890 F.2d 1312, 1321 (5th Cir. 1989).
212. Felice, 426 F.2d at 194-95; Wagner v. United States, 264 F.2d 524, 531 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 936 (1959).
213. See Herbert v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 911 F.2d 1044, 1048 (5th Cir. 1990);
Jones v. Otis Elevator Co., 861 F.2d 655, 659 n.4 (11th Cir. 1988); Livermore, supra
note 172, at 31.
214. Stier, supra note 170, at 153.
215. United States v. Pryor, 32 F.3d 1192, '194 (7th Cir. 1994).
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by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, renders the uncalledwitness rule an anachronism. A litigant may use modern
discovery procedures to ascertain the identity and proposed
testimony of witnesses identified with her opponent. If the
district court finds that a party is concealing the identity and
location of persons with knowledge of discoverable matter,
the court may impose an appropriate penalty.
...Accordingly, if unconstrained by precedent, we would
hold that in trials conducted under the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the trier of
fact may draw no inference from a party's mere failure to call
a witness who is susceptible to subpoena by either party, and
that it is inappropriate for -counsel to argue to the fact finder
that such an inference is permissible.2 16
Similarly, McCormick suggests that, with the advent of modern
discovery procedures, the adverse inference doctrine has diminished utility in civil cases.217 Certainly, modern discovery and
subpoena power have obviated much of the need for the doctrine,
but, in the context of nonproduction of evidence located abroad
and subject to nondisclosure statutes, a domestic litigant has a
reduced ability to compel production, and the court is under an
obligation to balance the forum interest in production against
the interests of the nation opposing discovery.21 8 In such cases,
one can hardly say that the requested evidence is equally available to both sides. Although a district court has unchallenged
authority to compel production2 19 and sanction accordingly,2 2 °
the doctrine of adverse inferences provides an intermediate
option between draconian sanctions and complete surrender to
the foreign blocking statute.
The inference drawn from the nonproduction of evidence has
been challenged on the ground that many of the various reasons
for nonproduction may be legitimate tactical concerns and not
technically adverse. At least in the context of a proffered for216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
F.2d

Herbert, 911 F.2d at 1048 (footnotes omitted).
CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 272 (3d ed. 1984).
See supra notes 83-146 and accompanying text.
See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
See, e.g., Livermore, supra note 172, at 30 (citing United States v. Hines, 470
225, 230 (3d Cir. 1972) ("Often all that can be inferred is that the [evidence]
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eign illegality excuse for the nonproduction of evidence under a
valid discovery order, the nonproducing party not only has the
opportunity to explain the reasons for nonproduction2= but also the obligation to provide the district court with specific reasons for noncompliance, which may include proof of an actual
conflict with the foreign law and good faith efforts to obtain a
waiver from its terms.2" Although some commentators have
viewed a nonproducing party's ability to rebut the inference by
explanation as "unsatisfactory" and an "invit[ation to] the jury to
consider a collateral issue,"224 in light of a proffered foreign illegality excuse, the reasons for a nonproducing party's inability
to comply with a discovery order cannot be described as collateral. In fact, in the foreign illegality context, nonproduction and
noncompliance are synonymous.2" A nonproducing party's explanations as to the reasons for noncompliance will not only
determine the propriety of sanctions 6 but will also factor into
both the court's decision as to the propriety of an adverse inference instruction 7 and the jury's decision on how much
weight, if any, should be given to counsel's argument urging
adverse inferences from a party's failure to produce the evidence in question.'
The third criticism of the adverse inference doctrine asserts
that the adverse inference instruction is duplicative of arguments made at closing and tends to overemphasize the unprowould not have been helpful to a party, not that the [evidence] would have been adverse."), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 968 (1973)).
222. Indeed, Wigmore noted that the adverse inference is "open always to explanation by circumstances which make some other hypothesis a more natural one than
the party's fear of exposure." 2 WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 285. In fact, "[elrror occurs if a party is denied an opportunity to explain the absence of [evidence]."
Livermore, supra note 172, at 30 n.12 (citing United States v. McCaskill, 481 F.2d
855 (8th Cir. 1973)).
223. See supra notes 61-82 and accompanying text.
224. Livermore, supra note 172, at 30.
225. Recall that a district court examines the foreign illegality excuse for nonproduction after discovery has been ordered. See supra notes 132-46 and accompanying
text. Accordingly, in this context, use of the adverse inference doctrine is not open
to the challenge that the evidence was equally available to the proponent of the
doctrine.
226. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
227. 2 WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 285.
228. 6 id. § 1806.
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duced evidence.229 In United States v. Pryor,230 Judge
Easterbrook made a forceful argument that the use of the
adverse inference instruction in the weaker evidence context
was superfluous and duplicative of allowed arguments by
counselY
Given the permissive tone of the adverse inference instruction,
Judge Easterbrook's approach is appealing. However, prohibiting
adverse inference instructions precludes their effective use not
only as an illumination of the law concerning nonproduction but
also as a check on potential overreaching by counsel during
closing arguments. As one commentator observed, "Wjurors are
expected to sort through not only the mass of conflicting testimony and exhibits but also the arguments of counsel. The absence
of instructions leaves jurors with their individual conceptions
and misconceptions of what the applicable law is." 2
Application of the Adverse Inference Doctrine to Nonproduction of
Evidence Due to Foreign illegality
The availability of adverse inferences for the failure of a party
to produce evidence located abroad and subject to foreign nondisclosure laws was first articulated by the Supreme Court in

229. See United States v. Pryor, 32 F.3d 1192, 1194 (7th Cir. 1994).
230. Id. at 1192.
231. Id. at 1194. Judge Easterbrook stated:
The judge declined to give this instruction, lifted from a formulary. He
might have declined on the ground that it is pabulum. Telling the jury
that it may, but needn't, "consider" a fact is not informative. Of course
the jury may consider the strength of the evidence. Why give vapid instructions that add nothing to the arguments of counsel?
Id.
232. Stier, supra note 170, at 169 (citing United States v. Young, 463 F.2d 934,
945 (D.C. Cir 1972) (Robinson, J., concurring)). To recognize the utility of the adverse inference instruction is not to denigrate the district court's discretion in determining when its use is appropriate. Such discretion is universally recognized. Pryor,
32 F.3d at 1194; United States v. Frost, 914 F.2d 756 (6th Cir. 1990); Wilson v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 893 F.2d 1149, 1150 (10th Cir. 1990); United
States v. St. Michael's Credit Union, 880 F.2d 579, 597 (1st Cir. 1990); Brownlow v.
Aman, 740 F.2d 1476 (10th Cir. 1984). Just as a district court may determine that
an adverse inference instruction is inappropriate to a certain situation, it has discretion to limit comments by counsel during closing arguments concerning adverse
inferences. United States v. Sblendorio, 830 F.2d 1382, 1394 (7th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1068 (1988).
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Societe Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et
Commerciales, SA." Although reversing the district court's
decision to award dismissal as a sanction, the Court refused to
limit the possible discretionary remedies available for a failure
to comply with a production order. 4 The Court noted that, on
remand, the district court may "be justified in drawing inferences unfavorable to petitioner as to particular events." 5
Reported cases involving the nonproduction of evidence located abroad usually discuss the availability of adverse inferences,
if at all, as a possible sanction under Rule 37 for failure to
comply with a production order. 6 One commentator has
made several observations pertinent to the doctrine of adverse
inferences:
(1) District court judges.., do not hesitate to order discovery in the face of foreign illegality. They are aware that foreign governments often waive their non-disclosure laws ....
(2) [In an effort to achieve partial waiver of foreign nondisclosure laws,] [jEudges, charged with the enforcement of...
United States antitrust laws, often do not hesitate to...
threaten[] harsh remedies for noncompliance, thus exercising
leverage for a favorable settlement.
[(3)]. . . [C]ourts ... do not hesitate to announce their
intention to draw negative inferences of fact under Rule 37
should full production not occur. In many cases,23such a threat
is equivalent to a threat of a default judgment. '
The consistent tenor of this judicial approach seems to embrace
the facilitation of evidence production. Courts seek to promote
the flow of evidence, not the utilization of Rule 37 sanctions.
Although a court may be willing to concede to a "narrowing" of
requested evidence, disclosure remains the touchstone."5
233. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
234. Id. at 213.
235. Id.
236. See, e.g., id. at 212-13; In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138,
1148 (N.D. Ill.1979) (discussing Societe Internationale); see also Smith, supra note
64, at 762-63 (citing In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig., M.D.L. Docket No. 50, Misc.
45-70 (D.D.C. Jan. 22, 1974)).
237. Smith, supra note 64, at 757-58 (citations omitted).
238. See, e.g., In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. at 1155 ("[D]efendants
argue that they are equally prejudiced by the nondisclosure laws, since they may be
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Drawing negative inferences of fact under Rule 37 is not,
however, the same as applying the doctrine of adverse inferences. In the Rule 37 setting, a judge may impose a penalty upon
the nonproducing partyas a matter of law, which simply deems
certain facts established. 9 Such a sanction would almost certainly be given only upon a finding that the nonproducing party
either "courted legal impediments" to discovery or acted in bad
faith. 40 The sanctions available under Rule 37 allow a district
court to enforce discovery and ensure that a party does not benefit from the willful secreting of evidence. Similarly, a district
court's discretion to deny or narrow a discovery order serves the
valid purpose of observing international comity concerns and
ensuring that parties with evidence subject to nondisclosure
statutes are not punished when they have consistently acted in
good faith.
The shortcoming of the current approach to nonproduction due
to foreign illegality is that it envisions a mythical land of good
faith and bad faith, of willful secreting of evidence and honest
international business activity, of laws enacted to protect vital
national interests and laws enacted solely to combat American
discovery. Unfortunately, modern commercial litigation rarely
involves such extremes. Under the current approach, a district
court faced with inconclusive results of the balancing approach
is faced with a Hobson's choice of either resorting to compelled
discovery and possible use of Rule 37 sanctions or no discovery
at all. Either result may be riddled with inequity.
Expanded use of the doctrine of adverse inferences would
provide courts with an effective discretionary tool when the
balancing approach proves inconclusive. Threatened sanctions
certainly can work effectively as the final step in a reasoned
progression designed to bring relevant information before a
court. Utilization of the doctrine of adverse inferences, however,
would allow a district court to resolve the discovery issue by
leaving the determination of whether the nonproducing party
prevented from using exculpatory documents which are covered by those laws. However, the solution to this 'problem' lies in the fullest possible disclosure, not in a
mutual limitation on relevant information.") (citation omitted).
239. FED. R. CIV. P. 37.
240. Societe Internationale, 357 U.S. at 209.
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had been courting legal impediments with the finder of fact.
Permitting the jury to consider the circumstances surrounding
the nonproduction of evidence when foreign illegality is proffered
as an excuse would allow a district court to take a middleground approach when the balancing approach provides inconclusive results. Certainly, as a discretionary tool, the calculus for
determining the award of an adverse inference instruction would
track the analysis undertaken to weigh the propriety of ordering
production or requiring use of the Hague Evidence Convention
procedures.
From the preceding analysis, the prerequisites to the use of
the adverse inference doctrine in the case of a party failing to
produce evidence located abroad may be evaluated readily. The
requisite elements are: (1) evidence under the control of the
failing party that is (2) reasonably available to him and (3) not
reasonably available to the adverse party.24 ' The first section
set forth the factors that would favor a determination of a partylitigant's control over a third-party corporation within the transactional and discovery context. The second section set forth the
criteria a court must use to determine whether the discovery
sought would be reasonably available to a party exercising good
faith efforts. The third section went on to evaluate the likelihood
that the Hague Evidence Convention procedures would not constitute a viable alternative to frustrated discovery under the
Federal Rules.
The award of an adverse inference instruction, however, is
discretionary.242 In commenting on when a missing witness instruction should be ordered, one judge observed that it is especially true that when an instruction is sought that "creates evidence from the absence of evidence, the court is entitled to reserve to itself the right to reach a judgment as wisely as can be
done in all the circumstances, even when the general guidelines ...

are found to be supported by the evidence."24

Of course, knowing that the award of an adverse inference
241. 3 DEVPlT ET AL., supra note 7, § 72.16.
242. See United States v. St. Michael's Credit Union, 880 F.2d 579, 597 (1st Cir.
1989).
243. Burgess v. United States, 440 F.2d 226, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (footnotes
omitted).
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instruction is left to judicial discretion offers little in terms of
predictability. The best explanation for when a court should
permit the instruction in a case involving the failure to produce
evidence located abroad would seem to be when the balancing
approach provides inconclusive results. Such a result may arise
when the party resisting discovery establishes the conflict with
the foreign law and the vital foreign interests involved, but the
remaining factors-including good faith and importance of the
evidence to the litigation-remain unclear. In such a situation,
the district court would deny the motion to compel production
but would allow either an adverse inference instruction, arguments concerning adverse inferences, or both.
Accordingly, the adverse inference doctrine would operate in a
manner similar to when evidence is admitted conditioned upon a
finding of fact.244 Should a district court judge determine that a
conflict with the foreign nondisclosure statute exists but that the
Section 40 Test proves inconclusive, the jury would be permitted
to hear all the circumstances surrounding the nonproducing
party's failure to produce. The jury would then decide, using the
prerequisites discussed above, whether to infer that the evidence, had it been produced, would have been unfavorable to the
nonproducing party.
CONCLUSION

The law as it relates to the foreign illegality excuse for nonproduction of evidence located abroad is settled. The factors for
determining whether a party-litigant has control over a thirdp rty depository, the Section 40 Test for the appropriateness of
compelled production of evidence subject to nondisclosure statutes, and Soci~td Nationale's tripartite test for the use of the
Hague Evidence Convention procedures are the product of an
evolutionary approach developed by the federal courts in response to the problems posed by complex litigation implicating
the laws of a competing sovereign. Inquiries into issues of inter244. See FED. R. EVID. 104(b) ("When the relevancy of evidence depends upon

the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to,
the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the
condition.").
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national comity, good faith, and hardship demonstrate the
judiciary's reticence to formulate some form of binary test that
would provide a more mechanical litmus test for compelled
production.
The path to an order to compel the production of evidence
located abroad and subject to nondisclosure statutes is necessarily an uncertain one. The operation of any balancing test is inherently amorphous, and, when one balance test provides unpredictable results, judicial consideration of a proffered foreign
illegality excuse geometrically increases the uncertainty by lining up three consecutive factor-based tests as wickets to the
issuance of an order to compel production. Although the process
concededly does little to advance predictability, the existence of
the factor-based tests does provide specific criteria for corporations to consider before engaging in business practices that could
be construed, or misconstrued, as evidence-secreting or the
courting of legal impediments.
The factor-based tests are workable, and the time for academic critique of their utility has passed. Appropriate remedies,
however, have garnered little evaluation outside of the limited
choice between compelled production and complete surrender to
foreign blocking statutes. Given the judiciary's deliberate decision to construct a broad-based, factor-balancing test for the
issuance of a production order and for consistent inquiry into
issues of good faith and comity, distilling the choice of remedies
to an "either-or" proposition appears inconsistent.
Use of the adverse inference doctrine would allow the courts
to fashion a new solution to an old problem without deviating
from the existing law of evidence. Far from an innovation, the
adverse inference doctrine rests on the same common-law foundations that underlie the best evidence rule and modern spoliation doctrine. Although the modern discovery provisions of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure obviate the need for its application in most circumstances, the adverse inference doctrine
should be utilized as an intermediate remedy when a foreign
illegality excuse is proferred.
Paul Robert Eckert

